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Abstract
In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity
in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We
introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with
the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice function satisfies
strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As an implication, we show that
strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give
applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for
standard Nash implementation and partially honest Nash implementation and we
determine a certain equivalence among these theories.
Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; Maskin monotonicity, Private
goods economies; Single-peaked preferences.
JEL classification: C72; D71
1 Introduction
Arrow [1] was the first who wondered about the issue of constructing non-dictatorial
welfare functions by examining the combination of some desirable properties. These
∗Corresponding author.
Email addresses: diss@gate.cnrs.fr (M. Diss), ahmeddoghmi@hotmail.com (A. Doghmi), mtlidi2010@
gmail.com (A. Tlidi).
1
well-known prespecified properties are called unrestricted domain, Pareto efficiency, and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. He showed that any social welfare function
satisfying these properties, with at least two individuals and at least three alternatives, is
dictatorial. Gibbard [14] and Satterthwaite [29] inspected the possibility of constructing
non-dictatorial and non-manipulable (strategy-proof) social choice functions. They
proved that, in a strategic voting, if there are at least three alternatives, strategy-
proofness of any social choice function is equivalent to dictatorship.
From these two well-known impossibility results, the literature on social welfare and
social choice functions contains two main approaches in order to derive possibility results.
The first one is based on the relaxation of some properties provided by Arrow [1] for social
welfare functions and by Gibbard [14] and Satterthwaite [29] for social choice functions.
The second approach with which we are concerned in this paper, is based on the restriction
of preference domains available to the individuals. The most commonlyused domain
restriction on individual preferences is single-peakedness which allows to have very nice
and interesting results. This notion introduced by Black [3], requires that each agent
has a unique best alternative. In this domain, a large number of research papers have
examined the class of strategy-proof rules in different types of economies and voting
schemes. For instance, Dummett and Farquharson [12] and, subsequently, Pattanaik [27]
have shown that majority rule with Borda completion is strategy-proof if both admissible
preferences and admissible ballots are restricted to be single-peaked. Moulin [23] showed
that, when adding some fixed ballots to the agent’s ballots, all strategy-proof anonymous
and efficient voting rules can be derived from the Condorcet procedure. Nehring and
Puppe [25] provided a characterization of the set of social choice functions called voting
by issues. They showed that the set of voting by issues coincides with the set of onto
social choice functions satisfying strategy-proofness.
In this paper we deal with strategy-proofness versus efficiency on private good
economies with single-peaked preferences. Differently to the wide range of literature that
has analyzed the relation between strategy-proofness and efficiency in different domain
restriction in pure exchange economies, public good economies and voting schemes1,
there are few studies that inspected strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in private
good economies with single-peaked preferences. The well-known work in this subject is
the one of Sprumont [32] who characterized the uniform rule of Benassy [2] on single-
peaked domain. He established that this rule is the only rule that is strategy-proof,
anonymous, and Pareto-efficient. Ching [6] reinforced this result by replacing anonymity
by symmetry. He proved that the uniform rule is the only rule that satisfies strategy-
1The examination of the link between strategy-proofness and efficiency begins with Hurwicz [18] who
studied the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions in classical exchange
economies. In these domains, Zhou [34] proved that there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient,
non-dictatorial, and strategy-proof. Both Hurwicz [18] and Zhou [34] considered a classical domain where
agents preferences are assumed to be continuous, strictly monotonic and strictly convex. Schummer [30]
assumed that agents have homothetic and strictly convex preferences and examined the existence of rules
that verify the properties of strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency. He proved that any rule satisfying
these two properties is dictatorial. Hashimoto [17] considered a domain of Cobb-Douglas preferences
and demonstrated that a SCF is strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient if and only if it is dictatorial. More
recently, in a specific quasi-linear domain of pure exchange economies, Goswami et al [15] showed that if
a SCF satisfies Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness and a mild continuity property, then
it is dictatorial.
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proofness, symmetry, and Pareto-efficiency.
Our main concern in this paper is to show the equivalence between strategy-proofness
and unanimity. We introduce the property of Unanimity as a principle requirement to
characterize strategy-proof social choice functions for fair allocation problem. Unanimity
is a very mild efficiency requirement that tends to be quite compatible with strategy-
proofness and also with other requirements, but not much attention has been paid to
this property in previous literature. By providing a new property (Condition 1), we
prove that, if this requirement together with citizen sovereignty are held, a SCF satisfies
strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. This result has an implication on the
relationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity2. Thus, we show that
if the requirements of citizen sovereignty and Condition 1 are satisfied, strategy-proofness
and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent.
In connection with implementation literature, the properties of Maskin monotonicity,
unanimity, and strategy-proofness play a central role. Specifically, they constitute
respectively necessary conditions for Nash implementation with standard agents, Nash
implementation with partially honest agents, and dominant strategy implementation.
In our context of private good economies with single-peaked preferences, Doghmi and
Ziad [10, 11], and Doghmi [9] proved that Maskin monotonicity and unanimity are not
only necessary but become also sufficient when the property of citizen sovereignty is
met. Hence, basing on the equivalence results for Maskin monotonicity, unanimity,
and strategy-proofness (Theorems 1 and 2), we give a full characterization for standard
Nash implementation (Corollary 2) and partially honest Nash implementation (Corollary
3) and we prove that if the requirements of citizen sovereignty and Condition 1 are
satisfied, these theories become equivalent (Corollary 4). Hence, we conclude that the
property of strategy-proofness is not only a necessary condition for dominant strategy
implementation, but provides a full characterization for Nash implementation with
standard agents and with partially honest ones. This shows that these later theories
and dominant strategy implementation are very near each other in our setup. Therefore,
it would be interesting to study the problem of implementation in dominant strategy
equilibria rather than in Nash equilibria in private good economies with single-peaked
preferences. This is a fruitful area which we leave for future research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce notations and
definitions in our framework of private good economies with single-peaked preferences.
In Section 3, we present the main result of the paper that establishes the equivalence
between strategy-proofness and unanimity. In Section 4, we study the implication of
this result on the relationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. In
Section 5 we examine the connection between these results and implementation literature
and in Section 6 we conclude.
2Among the works that have been interested in the connection between strategy-proofness and Maskin
monotonicity is that of Muller and Satterthwaite [24] who the first were showed that, in a model of public
good economies, the two properties are equivalent. Bochet and Storcken [4] defined several conditions to
construct maximal domains for Maskin monotone and strategy-proof rules. They proved that a choice
rule is strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotone. Recently, Klaus and Bochet [20] generalized
the model of Muller and Satterthwaite by covering private goods economies and they proved that there
is a close link between the two properties.
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2 Notations and definitions
In this section, we provide the terminology and notations required for our results. We
use the standard model of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We
consider an amount Ω ∈ R++ of a certain infinitely divisible good that is to be allocated
among a set N = {1, ..., n} of n agents. We represent the preference of each agent i ∈ N
by a continuous and single-peaked preference relation Ri over [0,Ω]. For all xi, yi ∈ [0,Ω],
xi Ri yi means that, for the agent i, to consume a share xi is as good as to consume the
quantity yi. The asymmetrical and symmetrical parts of the relation Ri are given by Pi
and ∼i, respectively. Single-peakedness means that there is a number p(Ri), called the
peak of Ri, such that for all xi, yi ∈ [0,Ω], if yi < xi ≤ p(Ri) or p(Ri) ≤ xi < yi, then
xi Pi yi.
The class of all single-peaked preference relations is represented by <spi ⊆ <i. Let
<sp = <sp1 × ... × <spn be the domain of single-peaked preferences. For R ∈ <sp, let
p(R) = (p(R1), ..., p(Rn)) be the profile of peaks (or of preferred consumptions). A single-
peaked preference relation Ri ∈ <spi can be described by the function ri : [0,Ω]→ [0,Ω]
which is defined as follows: ri(xi) is the consumption of the agent i on the other side
of the peak which is indifferent to xi if it exists, or else, it is 0 or Ω. In other words, if
xi ≤ p(Ri), then, ri(xi) ≥ p(Ri) and xi ∼i ri(xi) if such a number exists or ri(xi) = Ω
otherwise. However, if xi ≥ p(Ri), then, ri(xi) ≤ p(Ri) and xi ∼i ri(xi) if such a number
exists or ri(xi) = 0 otherwise.
For R ∈ <sp, a feasible allocation for the economy (R,Ω) is a vector x ≡ (xi)i∈N ∈ Rn+
such that
∑
i∈N xi = Ω and X is the set of the feasible allocations. For all Ri ∈ <spi
and all x ∈ X, the lower contour set for agent i at allocation x is denoted by L(x,Ri) =
{y ∈ X | x Ri y}. The strict lower contour set and the indifference lower contour set are
denoted LS(x,Ri) = {y ∈ X | x Pi y} and LI(x,Ri) = {y ∈ X | x ∼i y}, respectively.
We note that the feasible allocations set is X ⊆ [0,Ω]× ...× [0,Ω]. Thus, L(x,Ri) = X
is equivalent to L(xi, Ri) = [0,Ω]. In addition, for all two feasible allocations x ≡ (xi)i∈N
and y ≡ (yi)i∈N in the set of the feasible allocations X, the expression x Ri y implies
xi Ri yi. Finally, we note that the free disposability of the good is not assumed and we
introduce the definitions that will be useful throughout the paper. Our first definition is
the notion of Social choice function.
Definition 1. (Social choice function)
A social choice function (SCF) is a single-valued mapping from <sp into X, that associates
to every R ∈ <sp an element of X.
In other words, a SCF is a function that maps the individual preferences (here assumed
to be single-peaked preferences) to a single collective choice in the set X. We now discuss
in turn the properties that will play a central role throughout this essay.
The property of Strategy-proofness gives agents an incentive to bid their true
preferences since it is a property which requires that no agent ever benefits from
misrepresenting his preference relation. For agent i ∈ N and a preference profile R ∈ <sp,
we obtain a preference profile (R′i, R−i) ∈ <spi by replacing the i’s true preference Ri by
R′i and keeping the preferences of other agents R−i unchanged. Then, strategy-proofness
is formally defined as follows:
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Definition 2. (Strategy-proofness)
A SCF f satisfies the strategy-proofness property if for all R ∈ <sp, all i ∈ N , and all
R′i ∈ <spi, fi(R)Rifi(R′i, R−i).
Next, the well-known Unanimity condition means that if everyone prefers a particular
allocation over all other allocations, then the SCF should choose this particular allocation.
In our context, it is equivalent to the requirement that if there is an allocation at which
each agent receives his peak amount, then it should be chosen by the society. The formal
statement of this property is given as follows:
Definition 3. (Unanimity)
A SCF f satisfies unanimity if for any x ∈ X, any R ∈ <sp, and any i ∈ N , L(xi, Ri) =
[0,Ω] implies f(R) = x.
The next axiom is called Citizen sovereignty which requires that every possible
allocation can be achieved from a set of individual preference ranking. In other terms,
this condition implies that everyone must, without restriction, have a say in the allocation
process. Formally, we have the following definition:
Definition 4. (Citizen sovereignty)
A SCF f satisfies the property of citizen sovereignty if for each x ∈ X, there is a profile
R ∈ <sp such that f(R) = x.
We also consider the well-known Maskin monotonicity condition. Loosely speaking,
consider some profile of preferences R and an allocation x chosen as a solution by the
social choice function f : f(R) = x. Now, consider a second preference profile R′ such
that, for each agent, the set of allocations that he now finds at most as good as that
allocation contains the corresponding set for his initial preferences: L(xi, Ri) ⊆ L(xi, R′i).
Then, the allocation should still be chosen as a solution for the new profile: f(R′) = x.
Maskin monotonicity is formally defined as follows:
Definition 5. (Maskin monotonicity)
For all R,R′ ∈ <sp, a SCF f satisfies Maskin monotonicity if for any f(R) = x and any
i ∈ N , L(xi, Ri) ⊆ L(xi, R′i) implies f(R′) = x.
3 The main result
In this section we study the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity in private
good economies with single-peaked preferences. More precisely, in this framework and
under a certain condition, we prove in Theorem 1 that a SCF satisfies strategy-proofness
if and only if it is unanimous. In this way, both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 present
a complete proof of this theorem. To show this, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If a SCF f satisfies strategy-proofness, and there are two preference profiles
R, R̂ ∈ <sp such that for i ∈ N , L(fi(R), R̂i) = [0,Ω], then fi(R) = fi(R̂).
Proof. Let R, R̂ ∈ <sp such that for i ∈ N , L(fi(R), R̂i) = [0,Ω] (1). We want to show
that fi(R) = fi(R̂). We first show that fi(R) = fi(R̂i, R−i). From (1), fi(R)R̂ifi(R̂i, R−i).
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By strategy-proofness, fi(R̂i, R−i)R̂ifi(R), and hence fi(R)∼̂ifi(R̂i, R−i). We have in (1),
L(fi(R), R̂i) = [0,Ω], therefore, by single-peakedness, fi(R) = fi(R̂i, R−i) (2). Now, to
prove that fi(R) = fi(R̂), we assume that R
k
= (R̂1, ..., R̂k−1, Rk, ..., Rn), i.e., the k − 1
first elements come from the profile R̂ and the rest come from R noting that for k = 1 and
k = n+1, we have R
1
= R and R
n+1
= R̂ (3) . Now, R
k+1
= (R̂1, ..., R̂k, Rk+1, ..., Rn), i.e.,
R
k+1
= (R̂k, R
k
−k). We also have R
k
= (Rk, R
k
−k). From (2), fi(Rk, R
k
−k) = fi(R̂k, R
k
−k),
i.e., fi(R
k
) = fi(R
k+1
), and hence fi(R
1
) = fi(R
n+1
). From (3), fi(R) = fi(R̂). Q.E.D
Proposition 1. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if the
property of citizen sovereignty holds, any strategy-proof SCF satisfies unanimity.
Proof. Assume that a SCF f satisfies citizen sovereignty and strategy-proofness, but
not unanimity. Unanimity is violated if, for any x ∈ X, any R ∈ <sp, and any i ∈ N ,
we have L(xi, Ri) = [0,Ω] (1), but f(R) 6= x. Denote fi(R) = yi 6= xi for some i ∈ N
(2). By citizen sovereignty, there is a profile R∗ ∈ <sp such that fi(R∗) = xi. From
(1), L(fi(R
∗), Ri) = [0,Ω]. By Lemma 1 we have fi(R∗) = fi(R), which contradicts (2).
Q.E.D.
To examine the converse, we need to introduce the following condition.
Condition 1. Let R ∈ <sp, i ∈ N , x, y ∈ X, and let x = f(R). If xi ∈ LS(yi, Ri), then
there exists R∗ ∈ <sp such that (i) fi(R∗) = yi and (ii) L(xj, R∗j ) = [0,Ω] for all j ∈ N .
Roughly, Condition 1 means that if at a profile Ra socially chosen share xi is strictly
dominated by a share yi for an agent i , then there exists a new profile R
∗, in which the
agent i′s component yi is chosen, and xi improves it’s ranking and becomes top-ranked
for all agents. This condition is introduced recently by Diss et al [8] in the context of
many-to-one matching markets. They provided as examples satisfying this requirement
any sub-solution to the stable matching correspondence associated with the set of weakly
Pareto efficient outcomes. In our setup, we show in Remark 1 below that this condition
is checked by all social choice functions satisfying citizen sovereignty and the following
property of external stability : An SCF f(R) ⊆ X is externally stable under R if every
allocation in X \f(R) is dominated by f(R). This property and its weak version are used
by So¨nmez [31] and Demange [7] to characterize strategy-proofness of essentially single-
valued cores and coalitional strategy-proofness of the core correspondence respectively in
a general model of indivisible good allocation3.
Remark 1. If the requirements of citizen sovereignty and external stability hold, any
SCF satisfies Condition 1.
Proof. Assume not; i.e., for R ∈ <sp, i ∈ N , x, y ∈ X, and x = f(R) we have
xi ∈ LS(yi, Ri), but for all R∗ ∈ <sp, we have either fi(R∗) 6= yi (1) or there exists j ∈ N ,
L(xj, R
∗
j ) 6= [0,Ω] (2). The statement (1) contradicts the fact that f satisfies citizen
sovereignty. For statement (2), L(xj, R
∗
j ) 6= [0,Ω] for some j ∈ N means that there exists
zj ∈ [0,Ω] such that zjPjxj, that is f is not externally stable, a contradiction. Q.E.D
3The core is the set of all allocations wich are not dominated by any other allocation. A core is
essentially single-valued if it is nonempty-valued, and Pareto indifferent, i.e. two allocations are Pareto
indifferent under a preference profil R if they are indifferent for all agents at R.
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Proposition 2. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if Condition
1 holds, then any unanimous SCF satisfies strategy-proofness.
Proof. Assume that a SCF f satisfies unanimity, but not strategy-proofness. The
strategy-proofness is violated if there exist R ∈ <sp, i ∈ N , and R′i ∈ <spi , such that
fi(R
′
i, R−i)Pifi(R). Denote fi(R) = xi and fi(R
′
i, R−i) = yi. Hence xi ∈ LS(yi, Ri) (1)
and by Condition 1, there exists R∗ ∈ <sp such that fi(R∗) = yi and L(xj, R∗j ) = [0,Ω]
for all j ∈ N . By unanimity f(R∗) = x, i.e., fi(R∗) = xi . Therefore, xi = yi which
contradicts (1). Q.E.D.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we complete the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if Condition
1 and the property of citizen sovereignty hold, then a SCF satisfies strategy-proofness if
and only if it is unanimous.
4 Implications
As described in the Introduction, the investigation of the relation between Maskin
monotonicity and strategy-proofness is not new and there is considerable literature
dealing with this issue. In this section, we study the consequence(s) of introducing of
the property of unanimity on the relationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin
monotonicity. For this, we begin by examining the relation between unanimity and
Maskin monotonicity. In this way, we give the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if the
property of citizen sovereignty holds, then any Maskin monotonic SCF satisfies unanimity.
Proof. Suppose not. Let x ∈ X and R˜ ∈ <sp be such that for any i ∈ N , [0,Ω] =
L(xi, R˜i), and f(R˜) 6= x. By the property of citizen sovereignty, for all x ∈ X, there is a
profile R ∈ <sp such that f(R) = x and so for all i ∈ N , L(xi, Ri) ⊆ [0,Ω] = L(xi, R˜i).
By Maskin monotonicity, f(R˜) = x, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
From Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we give the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if the
requirements of citizen sovereignty and Condition 1 hold, then any Maskin monotonic
SCF satisfies strategy-proofness.
Now, by using Proposition 1, we prove that strategy-proofness implies Maskin
monotonicity.
Proposition 4. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if Condition
1 and the property of citizen sovereignty holds, any strategy-proof SCF satisfies Maskin
monotonicity.
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Proof. Assume that a SCF f satisfies strategy-proofness and citizen sovereignty, but
not Maskin monotonicity. Then, for any R,R′ ∈ <sp, any f(R) = x, and any i ∈ N ,
L(xi, Ri) ⊆ L(xi, R′i) (1), but f(R′) 6= x (2). We have f satisfies strategy-proofness; that
is for all R ∈ <sp, all i ∈ N , and all R˜i ∈ <spi , fi(R)Rifi(R˜i, R−i). Hence xiRifi(R˜i, R−i).
From Proposition 1, f is unanimous. Hence, by (2), f(R′) 6= x implies that there exist
i ∈ N and yi ∈ [0,Ω] such that yiP ′ixi and by (1) we have yiPixi. Let fi(R˜i, R−i) = zi.
Therefore yiPizi (3), by Condition 1, there exists R
∗ ∈ <sp such that fi(R∗) = yi and
L(zj, R
∗
j ) = [0,Ω] for all j ∈ N . By unanimity f(R∗) = z, i.e., fi(R∗) = zi . Therefore,
zi = yi which contradicts (3). Q.E.D.
Through Corollary 1 and Proposition 4, we complete the proof of the second main
theorem of the paper.
Theorem 2. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if Condition 1
and the requirement of citizen sovereignty hold, a SCF satisfies strategy-proofness if and
only if it is Maskin monotonic.
From Propositions 2, 3, and 4 we complete the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 3. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if Condition
1 and the requirement of citizen sovereignty hold, a SCF satisfies unanimity if and only
if it is Maskin monotonic.
5 Applications to Nash implementation with
standard and partially honest agents
In this section we present two applications of our findings on some results from
implementation theory. We begin this section by recalling key ideas from implementation
theory that are relevant to the topics of our applications.
Implementation theory provides a framework for situations where resources have to
be allocated among agents but the information needed to make these allocation decisions
is dispersed and privately held. In addition, the agents possessing the private information
behave strategically. When a social designer want to maximize the welfare of a society,
which is represented by a social choice rule that selects desired outcomes, she/he confronts
some agents who state false preferences on alternatives in order to improve their payoff.
To address this problem of the truthful revelation, the social designer must conceive a
mechanism (game form) which interacts individuals according to their strategic behavior.
These individual strategic interactions can produce the predicted outcomes via a solution
concept (equilibrium) of the game. A social choice rule is said to be implementable if both
the desired and predicted outcomes coincide. This is eventually the aim of implementation
theory.
As we have already said in the Introduction, in implementation literature, the
properties of strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity, and unanimity are central.
More precisely, strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for dominant strategy
implementation, Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for standard Nash
implementation, and unanimity is a necessary condition for partially honest Nash
implementation. Using the above results of Theorems 1 and 2, we provide in the next
subsections a full characterization.
8
5.1 Strategy-proofness versus Nash implementation with
standard agents
A SCF f provides desired outcomes for a social designer. To implement this function,
the social designer organizes a non-cooperative game (game form) among a set of agents.
This game form is a pair Γ = (S, g) with S = S1× ...×Sn and g : S → X. For each agent
i ∈ N , Si is agent i’s strategy space, and g is the outcome function that associates an
outcome with each profile of strategies. Let R ∈ <sp a profile of preferences, and let Nash
equilibrium be a solution concept of the game (Γ, R). The set of Nash equilibria at state
R is denoted by NE(S, g, R) and the set of Nash equilibria outcomes is g(NE(S, g, R)).
A mechanism Γ = (S, g) implements a SCF f in Nash equilibria if for all R ∈ <sp,
f(R) = g(NE(S, g, R)). We say that a SCF f is implementable in Nash equilibria if
there is a mechanism which implements it.
From Theorem 2 of Doghmi and Ziad [11], it follows that in the private good economies
with single-plateaued preferences, when there are at least three alternatives and if the
requirement of citizen sovereignty holds, any SCF is Nash implementable if and only if
it satisfies Maskin monotonicity. Notice that this result remains true for the domain of
single-peakedness which is a particular case of the large domain of single-plateauedness.
This domain, which allows agents to be indifferent among several best elements, has
been explored by several authors in social choice theory and games theory. The reader is
referred to the more recent work of Bossert and Peters [5].
The relation of strategy-proofness with Nash implementation can be summarized from
Theorem 2 and Theorem 2 of Doghmi and Ziad [11] as follows.
Corollary 2. Let n ≥ 3. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if
Condition 1 and the requirement citizen sovereignty hold, a SCF is Nash implementable
if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness.
5.2 Strategy-proofness and unanimity versus Nash
implementation with partially honest agents
Here, we present an environment of partial honest agents. We consider the same well-
known model as the one considered in Dutta and Sen [13], Lombardi and Yoshihara [22],
Doghmi and Ziad [10], Korpela [21], Holden et al [19], Saporiti [28], Ortner [26], Hagiwara
et al [16], among others. More precisely, we assume that there are some players who
have a “small” intrinsic preference for honesty and each honest individual expresses her
preferences in a lexicographic way. For a domain of single-peaked preferences <sp, let Ci
be the other components of the strategy space (which depends on individual preferences,
social states, . . . ). The set Si = <sp × Ci represents the strategy profiles for a player
i and S = S1 × ... × Sn is a set of strategy profiles. The elements of S are denoted
by s = (s1, ..., sn). A domain is a set Dsp ⊂ <sp. For each i ∈ N , and R ∈ Dsp, let
τi(R) = {R} × Ci be the set of truthful messages of agent i. We denote by si ∈ τi(R)
a truthful strategy as player i is reporting the true preference profile. We extend a
player’s ordering over the set X to an ordering over strategy space S. This is because,
the players’ preference between being honest and dishonest depends on strategies that
the others played and the outcomes which they obtain. Let Ri be the preference of
player i over S in preference profile R. The asymmetrical and symmetrical parts of Ri
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are denoted respectively by Ri and ∼Ri . Let Γ be a mechanism (game form) represented
by the pair (S, g), where Si = Dsp × Ci and g : S → A is a payoff function.
Definition 6. A player i is partially honest if for all preference profile R ∈ Dsp and
(si, s−i), (s′i, s−i) ∈ S,
(i) When g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i) and si ∈ τi(R), s′i /∈ τi(R), then (si, s−i) Ri (s′i, s−i).
(ii) In all other cases, (si, s−i) Ri (s′i, s−i) iff g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i).
Let NE(g,R, S) be the set of Nash equilibria of the game (Γ,R). A mechanism
Γ = (S, g) implements a SCF f in Nash equilibria if for all R ∈ Dsp, f(R) = g(NE(g,R
, S)). We say that a SCF f is partially honest implementable in Nash equilibria if there
is a mechanism which implements it in these equilibria. In this framework, we recall the
Assumption A of Dutta and Sen [13].
Assumption A. There exists at least one partially honest individual and this fact is
known to the planner. However, the identity of this individual is not known to her.
According to Doghmi and Ziad [10], under Assumption A, the property of unanimity
alone is a sufficient condition for partially honest Nash implementation in private good
economies with single-peaked preferences. Doghmi [9] shows that, when the requirement
of citizen sovereignty holds, unanimity also becomes a necessary property in this area.
In connection with strategy-proofness, Proposition 7 and Theorem 2 of Doghmi [9] give
together with Theorem 1 the following result.
Corollary 3. Let n ≥ 3. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if
the requirements of citizen sovereignty, Assumption A, and Condition 1 hold, a SCF is
partially honest Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies strategy proofness.
From Corollaries 2 and 3, we give the following important result.
Corollary 4. Let n ≥ 3. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences,
if the requirements of citizen sovereignty and Condition 1 hold, then standard Nash
implementation and partially honest Nash implementation become equivalent.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced the property of unanimity as a mild requirement of efficiency to
characterize strategy-proof social choice functions. We have showed that, under a certain
simple condition, if the requirement of citizen sovereignty holds, a SCF satisfies strategy-
proofness if and only if it is unanimous. We have proved that this result has an impact
on the relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity, which become
equivalent. We have applied these results to implementation setting and we have showed
Nash implementation and partially honest implementation are equivalent.
Finally, we would like to mention that our work is based on single-valued rules,
thus, it seems very interesting to extend these results for multi-valued rules in a future
research. Another important open question is whether our findings can be extended to
other environments of individual preferences.
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